This paper explores options for reforming Medicare cost sharing in an effort to provide better financial protection for those beneficiaries with the greatest health care needs. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), we consider how unified annual deductibles, alternative coinsurance rates, and a limit on out-of-pocket spending would alter program spending, beneficiary cost sharing, and premiums for supplemental coverage. We show that adding an out-of-pocket limit and raising deductibles and coinsurance slightly would provide better safeguards to beneficiaries with high costs than the current Medicare benefit structure. Our estimates also suggest that policies protecting these beneficiaries could be structured in a way that would add little to overall program costs.
Despite recognition that shrinking the federal deficit will require controlling Medicare spending, it would be wrong to relegate potential Medicare reforms to only those that can generate program savings. For example, the current structure of traditional Medicare that includes Parts A (hospital insurance), B (supplementary medical insurance), and D (prescription drug coverage)-each with different deductibles and coinsurance rates and none with limits on beneficiary cost sharingrequires enrollment in three distinct programs and is quite different from private health insurance plans. Many private health insurance plans have separate deductibles and coinsurance arrangements for prescription drugs, but generally have more unified approaches to cost sharing for hospital and ambulatory services than exist in Medicare.
The most glaring difference between coverage under Medicare and private health insurance plans is that Medicare does not include annual limits on out-of-pocket spending-a key feature of many private health insurance plans-which means that Medicare beneficiaries with the greatest needs and spending could be exposed to a far larger financial burden than a similar person with private health insurance. This potentially inadequate financial protection for Medicare beneficiaries is a strong motivation for having supplemental coverage, either privately or through employers.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) considered the costs of replacing the ''current complicated mix of cost sharing provisions'' in Medicare Parts A and B with a single annual deductible, uniform coinsurance, and an out-of-pocket limit (CBO 2008) . Maxwell, Storeygard, and Moon (2002) also considered a range of approaches to ''modernizing Medicare cost sharing'' that would have added an out-of-pocket limit and shifted the burden of deductibles away from inpatient care toward ambulatory services that are more discretionary. In an effort to both transform Medicare cost sharing and internalize the provision of Medigap benefits through a comprehensive Medicare benefits option, Davis et al. (2005) proposed ''Medicare Extra (Part E)'' that would be less costly than private ''Medigap'' largely as a result of the program's lower administrative costs.
In this paper, we build on these earlier studies by exploring the costs of alternative, comprehensive Medicare benefit reforms and how these options would change the distribution of spending. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), we consider how unified annual deductibles, alternative coinsurance rates, and an out-of-pocket limit would alter program spending, beneficiary cost sharing, and premiums for supplemental coverage. Our analysis also explores how beneficiaries with different health statuses and levels of out-ofpocket spending would be affected by our various benefit reforms.
Policy Options
Before describing the specific policy options we consider in this study, we provide some context about the financial burden that beneficiaries face under the current premium and cost-sharing structure in Medicare. Figure 1 shows the distribution of out-of-pocket spending (premiums and cost sharing for Medicare-covered services) for Medicare beneficiaries by income in 2006. 1 Median out-ofpocket spending was about $2,200. However, beneficiaries near the upper tail of the spending distribution spent two to three times the median level of out-of-pocket spending, with 1% of beneficiaries spending more than $6,700. Given that median income among the elderly was about $19,000 in 2006, the burden of out-of-pocket spending can be over onethird of income for some beneficiaries.
This suggests that despite the potential financial protections for some low-income beneficiaries available through the Medicare Savings Programs and the low-income subsidies in Part D prescription drug coverage, Medicare still requires large out-of-pocket outlays from beneficiaries who need to use large amounts of health care services-and that burden can be particularly great for beneficiaries with low incomes. With this in mind, we develop several specific policy options aimed at restructuring Medicare cost sharing so that the program provides better protection to beneficiaries facing high costs and is more in line with private health insurance coverage. We consider the potential impact of changes in deductibles, coinsurance, out-of-pocket limits, and the Part D ''doughnut hole.'' Each of the policy options shown in Table 1 would eliminate Part D deductibles and the doughnut hole-the coverage gap that in 2006 occurred when drug costs reached $2,250 and required full payment by the beneficiary until costs reached $5,100 when insurance kicked back in. The premiums for beneficiaries receiving Part D lowincome subsidies would stay the same and beneficiaries not receiving subsidies would have a 25% coinsurance until total drug spending reached $14,400 or out-of-pocket spending reached $3,600; thereafter, beneficiaries would pay only 5% coinsurance for drugs. In addition, all of the options would have: 1) a uniform deductible for Part A and Part B covered services of $500 or $1,000; 2) one coinsurance rate for covered services under Parts A and B of either 10% or 20% 2 ; and 3) an out-of-pocket limit of either $4,000 or $5,000. Beneficiary deductibles and coinsurance, but not premiums, and the amount paid by other sources on behalf of beneficiaries for Medicare-covered services including prescription drugs would count toward the out-of-pocket limit. The choices we made related to the various parameters of the policy options are one set among a wider array of possibilities. Our intent is not to propose these as an exhaustive set of options, but instead to use them as examples of the types of policy changes that might be considered and to show how their effects might be assessed.
Data and Methods 3
To simulate the effects of potential benefit reforms on Medicare spending and beneficiary out-of-pocket spending, we used the 2006 HRS and the 2004 MCBS to construct a baseline reflecting the Medicare benefit structure in 2006. Constructing the baseline and simulating the impacts of various policy options to restructure Medicare require information on health care expenditures, and eligibility and participation in the low-income subsidy programs. To the best of our knowledge, no single data source collects sufficiently detailed information to generate estimates for both.
The 2006 wave of the HRS is nationally representative of the noninstitutionalized population age 53 or older. The MCBS is a nationally representative sample of both aged and disabled Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of institutional status. To align with the HRS sample frame, we dropped beneficiaries residing in nursing homes and those younger than age 53. Both the HRS and the MCBS collect detailed information on demographics and health status. However, the MCBS lacks the detailed income and asset information required for modeling eligibility and the HRS lacks detailed information on health care utilization and expenditures to simulate the effects of alternative benefit design options. Our strategy was to combine these two data sources. For each respondent in the HRS, we found a statistical match from the MCBS and assigned the expenditure profile of the matched MCBS respondent to the HRS respondent.
The match between the HRS and the MCBS was based on variables common to The matched HRS-MCBS data contain the elements necessary to simulate eligibility for low-income subsidy programs at the beneficiary level, as well as health care utilization and expenditures at the medical event level. Several adjustments were made to the matched data to reflect the structure of the Medicare program in 2006, including the low-income subsidy programs, prescription drug coverage under Part D (which was not established in 2004-the source year for the MCBS), and Medigap premiums and retirees' share of premiums for employer-sponsored coverage (not routinely reported on the HRS or MCBS). We calculated premiums as actuarially fair and constructed them based on average spending by region plus a loading factor. All estimates were adjusted to 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Given a 2006 baseline, we applied the costsharing rules of alternative benefit structures to the expenditure profiles in the baseline to simulate their impacts on Medicare spending and beneficiary out-of-pocket spending. We excluded beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid, the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program, and Medicare Advantage plans because cost-sharing rules are quite different for them. 4 We did not incorporate the effects of changes in cost sharing on spending for Medicare-covered services, including prescription drugs, in order to focus our analysis on changes in the distribution of spending for the program and beneficiaries. 5 Each simulation shows how Medicare spending, benefi-ciary cost sharing, and other sources of spending would be altered by a different Medicare benefit structure.
Results
The first column in Table 2 shows the simulated baseline distribution of Medicare spending and beneficiary out-of-pocket costscost sharing, program premiums, and supplemental premiums-under current program rules across all fee-for-service beneficiaries not enrolled in Medicaid, QMB, or Medicare Advantage. This table averages across beneficiaries with supplemental coverage through an employer or private Medigap as well as those without any supplemental coverage. The top panel of Table 2 shows that spending for Medicare-covered services was, on average, $8,784 (in 2006 dollars), with $6,072 paid by Medicare (69%), $793 paid by beneficiaries as cost sharing (9%), and $1,919 paid by other sources (22%)-primarily supplemental insurers. 6 In addition to cost sharing, beneficiaries also were responsible for premiums that averaged $1,700 per year. This includes premiums for Part B ($1,033), Part D ($127), ESI coverage ($252), and private Medigap coverage ($288). 7 The remainder of Table 2 shows the impact of the various policy options we considered. We start with a comprehensive reform that would have a unified $500 deductible, 10% coinsurance for all Part A and B services, and an out-of-pocket limit of $4,000 in spending (Option 1). Moving across the table from the left, we gradually increase the deductible, then the out-of-pocket limit, and then the coinsurance rate. Option 1 is more generous than the current Medicare benefits structure and would impose $736 per beneficiary in additional program costs that would have to be financed in some way. Because we assume that overall spending for Medicare-covered services does not change, these higher program costs are offset by lower spending relative to the baseline on the part of beneficiaries, supplemental insurers, and other sources. This pattern holds for almost all simulations that increase program costs, although the extent of the increase in program cost varies across the options.
Moving from Option 1 to Option 2 (increasing the deductible from $500 to $1,000) would lower average Medicare costs by $213 (still $523 higher than under the current benefit structure). Average program costs would not decrease by the full $500 increase in the deductible because many beneficiaries would never spend up to the new $1,000 deductible. Similarly, moving from Option 2 to Option 3 (raising the outof-pocket limit from $4,000 to $5,000) would reduce program costs by only $200 ($323 higher than under the current benefit structure) because a relatively small share of beneficiaries incur more than $4,000 in required cost sharing (so most beneficiaries would be unaffected by the change). Moving from Option 3 to Option 4 (increasing the coinsurance rate from 10% to 20%) would decrease Medicare's spending by $180 per beneficiary ($143 more than under the current benefit structure); however, this option would increase beneficiary cost sharing and total out-of-pocket spending relative to the baseline because of a substantial increase in cost sharing that would occur among beneficiaries without any supplemental coverage (discussed in more detail with Table 3) . Table 3 disaggregates beneficiaries by their type of supplemental coverage-ESI, private, or none. Before considering how the various policy options affect each subgroup, it is useful to see how the subgroups compare at baseline. Beneficiaries with ESI supplemental coverage (55% of the sample) spend 3% more for Medicare-covered services than those with private Medigap coverage (21% of the sample), and about 50% more than those without supplemental coverage (24% of the sample). However, ESI supplemental coverage provides greater benefits than private Medigap, so cost sharing for beneficiaries with employer coverage is about 12% lower than for those with private Medigap. Data not shown suggest that greater ESI supplemental coverage relative to Medigap is largely related to more generous drug coverage.
A similar pattern of Medicare and beneficiary out-of-pocket spending holds across the three groups represented in Table 3 , but the relative impacts of each reform option differ somewhat. For the ESI supplemental group, Option 1 increases program spending by almost $1,000 over the baseline, with (by definition) an equal reduction in cost sharing and other sources of spending. However, although Medicare spending falls as we move from Option 1 to Option 4, it still remains above the baseline amount, while beneficiary cost sharing and premium spending are lower. This occurs because ESI supplemental coverage would be relieved of much of its obligations since Medicare would pay for drug coverage through the doughnut hole and limit out-of-pocket spending. Because payments from private Medigap coverage are much lower than they are from ESI supplemental coverage, the additional Medicare spending and out-of-pocket savings are smaller for this subgroup in every option than they are for those with ESI. In fact, under Option 4 ($1,000 deductible/20% coinsurance/$5,000 out-of-pocket limit), the beneficiary's cost-sharing amount and privately purchased Medigap coverage costs are more than $200 above the baseline, and Medicare's program spending is $41 lower. For beneficiaries without any supplemental coverage, the out-of-pocket savings associated with Option 1 disappear most quickly as we move to the less generous options. This occurs because without supplemental coverage, the beneficiary is fully responsible for increases in the deductible and coinsurance rates.
Given the strong association between health status and health care spending-and to reflect the fact that the basic purpose of social health insurance is to protect the sickest beneficiaries from large financial burdens-we also examine how the effects of these policy options vary with beneficiary health status. Our expectations are that outof-pocket limits safeguard those with the highest spending (i.e., those in fair or poor health), and that higher deductibles and coinsurance will have effects throughout the spending distribution. Table 4 shows, not surprisingly, that beneficiary cost sharing under the policies modeled as Option 1 is lower than under the current benefit structure and increases for all beneficiaries as deductibles and coinsurance rates increase. The key finding, however, is that cost sharing remains below the baseline for beneficiaries in fair or poor health under all of these options, while it increases above the baseline in certain options for those in excellent, very good, or good health. Under Option 1, beneficiaries in excellent health save $32 in cost-sharing expenses, while those in poor health save $363; under Option 4, cost sharing for beneficiaries in excellent health is $70 higher than under the current benefit structure, while those in poor health still save an average of $89. The changes in premiums exhibit somewhat different patterns. As we move from Options 1 to 4 and gradually increase the cost-sharing responsibilities of Medicare beneficiaries and their supplemental payers, we observe an increase in premiums at all health statuses-but the size of the increase varies. Medicare program spending for those in poor health rises from $12,068 under the current benefit structure to $13,884 under Option 1, and decreases to $13,117 as we move from Option 1 to Option 4. Similar to the results by self-reported health status, Table 5 shows that beneficiaries with the most severe disabilities (measured by the number of activities of daily living [ADLs]) benefit the most from the proposed policy options. For example, as we move from the baseline to Option 4 we find that beneficiaries with five or more ADLs save $106 in cost sharing, while cost sharing for beneficiaries with no ADLs increases by $17.
Another approach to highlighting the impact of these policy options on beneficiaries with different health care needs is to array the findings according to beneficiaries' baseline level (measured in deciles) of annual cost sharing or out-of-pocket spending. Table 6 (top panel) shows that annual cost sharing under current policies ranges, on average, from $20 in the bottom decile to $3,009 in the top decile. Option 1 would reduce cost sharing in the top decile to $1,857-a reduction of $1,152-but only increase it in the bottom decile to $50-an increase of $30. Similar to the results related to health status, the policy options we analyze provide greater protections for those with high cost sharing (i.e., the top two deciles) and spread the burden over the remainder of the Medicare cost-sharing distribution. The bottom panel of Table 6 shows the effects of the policy options on total out-of-pocket spending, with results that mirror those for cost sharing.
Discussion
Changing fee-for-service Medicare from a program that features separate deductibles for Part A and Part B services, a variety of coinsurance rates, and no limit on beneficiary cost sharing to a program that has a unified deductible, uniform coinsurance, and a limit on out-of-pocket spending can meet several policy objectives. First, it can offer better financial protection to beneficiaries with the greatest health care needs. This is the central focus of this study. Second, it can make Medicare more similar to typical employersponsored insurance plans and, therefore, smooth the transition from employer-sponsored coverage during working years to Medicare coverage during retirement. Medicare benefits restructured along the lines considered in this study also could form the basis for a buy-in program for the near-elderly or a public plan option should this provision re-emerge in a subsequent change to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Although the transformation of Medicare into a program with a unified deductible, consistent coinsurance (including elimination of the prescription drug doughnut hole) and an out-of-pocket limit can have implications beyond Medicare itself, the primary reasons for such a change rest on the need to improve performance of the program for beneficiaries. Currently, beneficiaries are required to meet a large hospital deductible and incur unlimited amounts of cost sharing. This benefit structure will inevitably put the greatest financial burden on beneficiaries with the greatest health care requirements. As a result, the risk-pooling features of this social insurance program are not as strong as they could be. This paper shows that any of the options considered would provide better protection to high-cost beneficiaries than the current Medicare benefit structure, primarily through the addition of an out-of-pocket limit. However, adding protection for these high-cost beneficiaries would have implications for overall program costs. The results indicate that the least generous of the options (Option 4) would add, on average, $143 per beneficiary to Medicare spending. Since these simulations only include fee-for-service beneficiaries not enrolled in Medicaid or the QMB program, this $143 average add-on would apply to about 27 million beneficiaries. This suggests an increase in Medicare program spending of about $4 billion annually, or a little more than 1% of Medicare's $376 billion in 2006 benefit payments. Of course, the other options in this study would be more expensive and pose a greater financing burden on the program. For example, Option 1 would add approximately $20 billion to Medicare costs. 8 The question for policymakers may be: ''Are current Medicare protections adequate or would it be worthwhile to incur additional program costs to provide better protection for beneficiaries with the highest out-of-pocket costs?'' However, it is also possible to design a benefit structure that keeps program costs roughly at current levels and still help beneficiaries with the greatest out-of-pocket spending. This could include a higher deductible and a higher out-of-pocket spending limit. The CBO simulated the costs of an option with a $525 unified Part A and Part B deductible, 20% coinsurance, and an out-of-pocket limit of $5,250. It did not incorporate changes in Part D in that option. The CBO analysis showed that these changes would actually reduce program costs by a little more than $2 billion annually by the fifth year following the policy change. Using the model we developed here, we concluded that eliminating the Part D doughnut hole and keeping Medicare spending virtually unchanged would require a $1,250 unified deductible for Parts A and B, 20% coinsurance, and a $5,250 out-of-pocket limit. These changes, however, could mean a substantially larger cost-sharing burden (or increase in premiums for supplemental coverage) for a majority of beneficiaries, which might make them difficult to implement.
We recognize that the sample used for this study excludes younger disabled beneficiaries not in the HRS and beneficiaries living in institutions. To the extent that any of the reform options we studied affect the costs associated with these groups, we are likely understating the additional program costs required in each instance. However, the younger disabled beneficiaries may not necessarily be more expensive than those included in our analytic sample. The excluded group is dominated by beneficiaries with mental illness that require high levels of prescription drug expenditures (Riley, Lubitz, and Zhang 2003) . Since the options we consider tend to shift costs onto beneficiaries at the low end of the spending distribution in exchange for protection at the high end, the implications for the younger disabled beneficiaries would depend on the cost of covered services for this group. The institutionalized subgroups of beneficiaries often are covered by Medicaid and, as such, already have protections from cost-sharing requirements. The Medicare options discussed in this paper might shift some costs currently paid for through Medicaid onto the Medicare program. The reason for this is that Medicaid already pays the deductibles and coinsurance for dually eligible beneficiaries. In terms of the simulations we presented, the impact on Medicaid should be similar to the effects we projected for other sources of spending.
As the simulations in this study indicate, beneficiaries with supplementary insurance still would have large financial obligations under the options considered here. Therefore, the demand for private Medigap coverage or ESI supplemental coverage would not be eliminated. In fact, given the large deductibles in some of the options and a desire for firstdollar coverage on the part of many beneficiaries, the incentive to have supplemental coverage might increase. Although the introduction of an out-of-pocket limit would curtail beneficiaries' spending, this might not cut into the demand for supplemental coverage, but could reduce its costs. Currently, there are new Medigap plans that limit out-of-pocket spending by having higher deductibles and coinsurance, but it remains to be seen whether beneficiaries will find them attractive (AHIP 2008) . Since this study did not directly examine the demand for Medigap coverage, we can only say that Medigap is likely to remain even should reforms of the overall Medicare benefit structure be implemented.
Given the long history of Medicare and its complicated cost-sharing structure, perhaps the most important finding from this study is that it seems possible to rationalize the costsharing structure without adding dramatically to program costs. The additional costs that would be required could be financed through higher premiums or payroll taxes or from general revenue sources. Using payroll taxes or general revenues would spread the additional financing burdens across larger numbers of people, with each paying relatively small increments, than would be the case if Medicare premiums were increased. The alternative financing mechanisms would have different distributional impacts. If desired, some degree of progressive increases could be built into them to make financing of a Medicare cost-sharing reform more equitable.
Additionally, restructuring Medicare cost sharing could serve as a first step for a Medicare buy-in program or create a building block for more workable public/private competition or broader coverage; this study suggests that this step can be taken without adding dramatically to program spending. We recognize that Medicare's fiscal challenges mean that any increases in program spending are difficult, but in the context of broader health care reform-of which Medicare is likely to be a major part-the extra costs are a small portion of the total.
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1 The data presented in this figure are from the baseline estimates derived from the simulation model used in the remainder of this paper. Details of this model are described in the next section of this paper. 2 For Part A covered services in 2010, for each benefit period of inpatient hospitalization, beneficiaries pay an inpatient deductible of $1,100, a copayment of $275 for days 61 to 90, $550 for days 91 to 150 and full costs beyond 150 days; for each benefit period of skilled nursing facility stay, beneficiaries pay $135 for days 21 to 100 and full costs beyond 100 days. For Part B covered services, after an annual deductible of $155 in 2010, Medicare beneficiaries pay 20% of the Medicare-approved amount for most doctor services, outpatient therapy, most preventive services, and durable medical equipment; beneficiaries pay 45% of the Medicare-approved amount for most outpatient mental health care; the copayment or coinsurance amount varies by service for each individual outpatient hospital service.
3 Please refer to a technical appendix available on the Urban Institute web site (see http:// www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID5412192) for a more detailed description of the data and simulation methods. 4 We recognize that by eliminating the institutionalized population (due to the sample design of the HRS) and beneficiaries who are dually enrolled in Medicaid or the QMB program (because of cost-sharing differences), we are not examining the subgroups with the greatest health care needs. However, since these subgroups do not face the same costsharing structure as other Medicare beneficiaries, they would not be affected by the reforms we are studying here. 5 We explored using standard actuarial induction techniques to estimate how the changes in beneficiary cost sharing would alter spending for Medicare-covered services. However, since the change in cost sharing associated with the various policy options was small, on average, induction also would have led to very small changes in average spending. Therefore, we chose to eliminate potential induction effects from this analysis. 6 More detailed information on the $1,919 in spending from other sources shows that, on average, $1,569 (82%) is from supplemental coverage (employer-sponsored, private Medigap, or a private HMO), $72 (4%) is from the Veterans Administration, $117 (6%) is uncollected patient liabilities (i.e., uncompensated care), and $140 (7%) is from other federal and state programs, such as state drug assistance programs. An additional $22 (1%) is reported as being from Medicare Advantage plans, suggesting enrollment for a limited time in one of these plans even though Medicare Advantage enrollees are otherwise excluded from this analysis. 7 In all instances, the averages shown in Table 2 are based on the entire analytic sample, including people who paid the various premiums as well as those who did not. In addition, the average ESI premium only represents the employee share of the premium for those who paid this premium. Please refer to the technical appendix (http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID 5412192) for a more detailed discussion on the construction of ESI and Medigap premiums. 8 As a result of reducing cost sharing for beneficiaries by adding a limit on out-ofpocket spending, it is possible that total spending for Medicare-covered services for those who exceed the limit could be increased as a result of moral hazard. However, we explored including this in the analysis (see endnote 4) and concluded that the effects were not large. Nevertheless, some readers may view our estimates of additional Medicare program spending as a lower bound. We caution against this interpretation, because although an out-of-pocket limit may stimulate use, higher deductibles and copayments would dampen use.
